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mAbstract: This study analyses the impact of Bolsa Família (a Brazilian conditional cash
transfer programme) in the allocation of labour inputs regarding formal and informal
activities. The methodology relies on a discontinuity in the programme eligibility rule
regarding children’s age to attain the identification of a LATE parameter. Our results
suggest that the cash transfer does not affect the occupational choice of Brazilian adults
neither among formal and informal jobs nor the allocation of hours across sectors.
JEL Codes: I38, O17.
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Bolsa Família Program (henceforth known as BFP) is a conditional cash transfer (CCT)
which aims to improve the welfare of poor families. There are programmes with simi-
lar characteristics to BFP in several developing countries, both inside and outside Latin
America. In some countries such as Brazil, the programme coverage is quite extensive.
For example, in 2013, BFP had already benefited more than 13 million households. In
this context, some concerns are raised regarding possible deleterious effects of this
CCT on the labour supply of adults1.
As CCT are usually targeted to low income households, there may be an incentive to
marginally eligible households to receive earnings in ways non-verifiable to third par-
ties, specially government or inspectors of the CCT program. In this sense informal ac-
tivities could be preferable, even more when there is high prevalence of this kind of
activities, as in Brazil, or Latin America in general.
The aim of this study is to investigate to what extent CCT programmes like BFP dis-
torts the occupational choice of beneficiaries in the sense of making them more likely to
shift supply of labour inputs pro informal activities. In particular, the goal is to analyse
BFP impacts both at intensive (hours) and extensive (jobs) margins of labour supply.
This shift in labour supply pro informal activities would be deleterious to society, for
at least three reasons. First, a change in the composition of employment, which re-
duces the share of the formal sector, compromises the state’s ability to fund its policies,
including those directly related to social welfare. A second reason for concern is the
lower quality associated to informal jobs in dimensions such as lower wages, higher
probability of workplace accidents and lack of social protection2. Lastly an informal at-
tachment to labour market could have deleterious effects for the worker in the long
run. Cruces et al. (2012) reports lower prospect of wage growth for those employed in
the informal sector in early stages of their professional life.2014 Barbosa and Corseuil; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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household survey with national coverage (PNAD) of accurate information both about
the formality status (formal or informal) of each job of each member of a sampled
household and on the status of the household on both eligibility and participation in
BFP (beneficiary or non-beneficiary).
There is, however, a major challenge for identification of BFP effects on any outcome
of interest, as is the case for labour supply in the present study. There is room for self
selection into the programme based on non-observable characteristics of the individ-
uals. This makes it difficult to find an ideal comparison group that resembles the treat-
ment group.
Our strategy for identifying the effect of BFP on labour supply composition among
formal and informal activities seeks to isolate the real effect of the programme from
outcome differences due to unobservable characteristics of individuals. We used a dis-
continuity in the BFP eligibility rule, which is a threshold value for the age of the youn-
gest children at the household, as an instrument that shifts participation in the
programme but does not change the outcome of interest (informality of labour inputs).
This type of strategy is known as Regression Discontinuity Design – RDD3. In particu-
lar, since eligibility does not coincide with participation in the programme, we employ
the version of this strategy known as a fuzzy RD. Our main identification hypothesis is
to assume that the unobservable characteristics of adults in families whose youngest
child reaches the age threshold for eligibility shortly before the beginning of the school
year are very similar to those of families whose youngest child reaches the eligibility
age threshold shortly after the beginning of the school year. This is considered a weak
assumption, given the randomness component involved in determining the exact date
of birth of an individual. In addition, we carried out tests whose results are consistent
with the validity of this hypothesis.
Empirical evidence of the impact of CCT programmes on the occupational choices of
adult programme beneficiaries is still incipient. What we do have are studies estimating
the impact on the labour supply of individuals disaggregated by occupation type (Skoufias
and Di Maro (2008); Ribas and Soares (2011) and Braw et al. (2012))4,5.
These three papers use some version of the difference-in-differences estimator. The
identification hypothesis in these works, therefore, is that the unobservable characteristics
of either individuals or group of individuals that influence the selection of the programme
are fixed in time. This could be a strong assumption as information about availability of
the program and eligibility criteria may vary over time, and this may change the compos-
ition of treatment and control group relative to preferences over informal jobs6.
The result found by Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) for Mexico indicates an effect on the
participation of self-employed individuals immediately after the implementation of the
programme. However, this effect disappears shortly thereafter. Ribas and Soares (2011)
identifies a decrease in the participation in the formal sector due to BFP. Braw et al.
(2012) reports an increase in working hours within the informal sector due to BFP.
Our results do not support the hypothesis that the BFP stimulate the informality among
beneficiaries in any of the informality dimensions considered. We show that barely eligible
households do have a higher probability of participation in BFP than barely ineligible ones.
However this difference in participation does not translate into difference in the supply of
labour inputs towards the informal sector. It is worth mentioning that this result is
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(jobs). Moreover jobs were considered in two alternative ways. First we consider only
the main job of the household head. The other alternative is to consider the second
most important job of the household (either the secondary job of the household head
or the main job of his/her partner).
This paper is organized into four sections, besides this introduction and a final sec-
tion devoted to concluding remarks. The next section presents the BFP rules, including
eligibility criteria and benefit amounts. The third section describes the econometric
procedures adopted for the evaluation of BFP’s impact on the composition of the labour
market. The database and the construction of our sample are presented in the fifth sec-
tion, which also provides some descriptive statistics. The main econometric results are
presented in the sixth section.2 BFP Eligibility criteria
Programme eligibility depends on two main criteria. The first is associated with socio-
economic status as measured by per capita household income (PCHI)—the sum of the
gross income earned by all family members divided by the total number of individuals
in the household. The second criterion is linked to family composition, in particular to
the age of the youngest child. BFP also requires the recipient to comply with condition-
alities associated with child health and education7.
In September 2006, two household groups were considered eligible. The first group
was composed of households with monthly PCHI between R$ 50.01 and R$ 100.00
(below the poverty line at the time) provided they had pregnant women, nursing
mothers, children and adolescents aged 0 to 15 years old. This group received a vari-
able benefit, depending on the number of members in the situations listed above,
reaching the limit of R$ 45.00. The other group consists of families in extreme poverty,
whose PCHI was less than or equal to R$ 50.00 monthly. Such families would receive a
basic benefit of R$ 50.00, regardless of their composition, and a variable benefit if there
were dependents among family members8. The maximum amount of BFP benefits that
an extremely poor family could receive was R$ 95.00.
Despite several studies that seek to reap the benefits of BFP exploring the condition
of eligibility based on the PCHI, in this paper we chose to explore the eligibility condi-
tion based on the age of the youngest child. As we will see later our methodology de-
pends, therefore, on individuals not being able to manipulate the value of the variable
of the eligibility criteria chosen. Given the existence of a birth certificate in Brazil, it
seems more reasonable to assume that there is no way to manipulate the age of the
children than it is to assume that there is no way to manipulate the PCHI. This argu-
ment is an immediate consequence of the fact that the income of an informal occupa-
tion can be hidden from those responsible for running BFP, unlike what happens with
the income derived from formal occupations9.
It is important to note how household selection takes place within the programme10.
The selection of BFP beneficiary households takes place under the aegis of the Ministério
do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS), Caixa Economica Federal (CEF)
and the municipalities11. The National Secretariat of Citizenship Income (SENARC),
under the MDS, is the agency responsible for the programme. Among other important
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ceive the benefit and how much they shall receive. It also defines the questionnaire used
to fill an administrative file with all potential beneficiaries (Cadastro Único) and the cri-
teria for suspending and cutting benefits, among several other operational parameter defi-
nitions. The role of CEF is quite significant for BFP. Besides being the operator and
payment agency, it is responsible for processing the information collected by municipal-
ities that makes up the Cadastro Único, as well as calculating the PCHI and how much
each family should receive, and paying the monthly benefit through magnetic debit cards.
The most important role of municipalities is the responsibility for identifying families to
be benefited, by gathering information that will be fed into the Cadastro Único. Sátyro
and Soares (2009) argue that, ultimately, municipal officers are the ones who decide who
will or will not be a potential beneficiary of Bolsa Família, in the sense that all the infor-
mation handled by CEF or analysed by SENARC is collected by them. According to the
authors, this “is a strategic role – without committed and well managed municipalities,
the very functioning of BFP would be compromised” (SOARES; SÁTYRO, p.17). It is clear,
then, that given the form of BFP management, beneficiaries tend to have an incentive to
work in the informal sector (with their incomes hidden from government agencies) and
still remain eligible for the BFP benefit.
In the next section, it will become evident that, the process of excluding households
that become ineligible is more important than the process of adding new households to
its rank of beneficiaries. In particular, the process of excluding households that become
ineligible according to the criterion of the age of the youngest child is central to our
analysis. According to BFP bylaws, exclusion does not occur immediately following the
16th birthday of the youngest child, but rather after the end of his/her school year.
As such, we shall base our empirical strategy—to be explained in the next section—
on comparisons of households that appear in the 2006 PNAD and in which the youn-
gest child was about to turn 16 years old on December 31, 2005 with households in
which the youngest child had just turned 16 years old by December 31, 2005.
3 Methodology
3.1 The identification problem and its consequences for estimation
The identification of the effect of BFP on occupational choice is not a trivial task, given
that there is room for self-selection of individuals in the programme. This problem
arises when the probability of an individual entering the programme depends on unob-
servable characteristics that may also influence their occupational choice.
The previous section provides evidence that there is room for this kind of problem, in
the case of BFP. Basically, the probability of selection will be greater for an eligible house-
hold that is better capable of becoming visible to the eyes of the municipal agents.
For a better view of the problems arising from self-selection based on unobservable
characteristics, consider the following regression model relating the supply of labour to
the informal sector from household “i” (Yi) to the age of the youngest child on the last
day of the previous year (Ii), as well as participation in BFP (Ti)
12:
Y i ¼ α1 þ β1 Ii – cð Þ þ λ1Ti þ γ1Ti Ii– cð Þ þ δ1Xi þ εi; ð7Þ
where c is a normalization constant representing the age limit of the youngest child tothe eligibility of the household (in our case, 16 years, exactly, on December 31,
Barbosa and Corseuil IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2014) 3:37 Page 5 of 182005), X denotes controls regarding characteristics of the household head (age, gen-
der and education), household size and location. Our parameter of interest is λ1,
which represents the effect of program participation on the supply of labour input to
the informal sector.
The fact that there is self-selection in BFP, based on unobservable characteristics,
leads to the following property of this model:
E εi T i;Xi; Ii ≠ 0j½ ð8Þ
Consequently, λ1 cannot be identified by comparing the occupational choices of those
who participated (T = 1) and those who did not participate (T = 0), even when keeping
the other explanatory variables of the model (X) constant. This is because, according to
(8), when T is varying ε is also varying. Therefore, we will not be able to separate the
effect on Y arising from the variation of T from that arising from the variation in ε. In
terms of estimation, this means that λ1 cannot be estimated consistently by ordinary
least squares.
In this case, the ideal scenario is to have some source of variation in T among indi-
viduals that does not affect ε. Put another way, it would be interesting to have a vari-
able at hand that affects the decision of individuals to participate in the program and
which is not related to unobservable characteristics of individuals. This variable serves
as an instrument for the correct identification of our parameter of interest, because we
do not want to know the impact of this variable, but its variation is used to shift partici-
pation, while keeping everything else constant13.
Generally, we resort to an exogenous eligibility criterion as the instrument for the
correct identification of the treatment. This exogenous criterion may be due to a ran-
dom draw or a discontinuity in the rule of eligibility. In the latter case, we have what is
conventionally called a fuzzy regression discontinuity14 in literature.
As discussed in the previous section, there is a discontinuity in BFP’s eligibility rule,
which prompts us to choose the fuzzy regression discontinuity approach. The identifi-
cation strategy associated with this approach can be viewed in Figure 1, which shows
participation in the program (T) in September 2006 (date of the 2006 PNAD) as a func-
tion of the gap that separates the age of the youngest child from the 16-year mark as of
31/12/2005. Thus, positive (negative) values on the horizontal axis denote households
where the youngest child had not yet (already had) turned 16 years of age by 31/12/
2005 and were, therefore, (in)eligible to the program in 2006.
Each point on the figure represents average values for household groups that were
grouped according to the age of the youngest child and, therefore, also in accordance with
the aforementioned gap. The aggregation used two-month intervals, so that the point at 1
on the horizontal axis shows the share of beneficiaries among households whose youngest
child was less than two months away from turning 16 years of age, by 31/12/2005; as op-
posed to the point −1, which shows the share of beneficiaries among households whose
youngest child had just turned 16 years of age in the last two, by 31/12/2005.
The comparison between households with young children who recently turned 16 or
who will turn 16 shortly after 31/12/2005 brings noticeable differences to the likelihood
of participating in the programme in 2006. Reading Figure 1 from the right to the left
clearly shows that participation in the programme drops sharply around the mark cor-
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Figure 1 Share of Households that Receive the BFP benefit. Source: 2006 PNAD.
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the values of ε), the age of the youngest child around 16 years is the exogenous vari-
ation that shifts T, keeping everything else constant, and, therefore, allows us to identify
the effect of Bolsa Família.
In the remainder of this section we will discuss identification in a more precise fash-
ion. A number of contributions have been made to guide researchers on the assump-
tions required to identify the effect of a programme in this context, as well as some
operational procedures for its estimation. Our intent is to follow the recommendations
of this recent literature, which can be accessed in the papers by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010), among other sources.
3.2 The solution via discontinuity
The identification and, consequently, the consistent estimation of parameter λ1 in
equation (7) require some additional assumptions. For the sake of exposition, we as-
sume, at first, that Bolsa Família uniformly affects the occupational choice of individ-
uals (a context that is often denoted in literature as ‘homogeneous effects’). In this
context, the following properties for households where young children are in an age
around c are sufficient to identify our parameter of interest15:
E εi I i ¼ c− ¼ Eεij jIi ¼ cþ½  ¼ 0 ð9Þ
E Ti Ii ¼ c− ≠ E Ti Ii ¼ cþj½j½ ð10Þ
In the case of the above equations, c− (c+) denotes ages that are very close to c, butsmaller (larger) than the exact value. In our context c− (c+) represents households with
young children aged slightly under (over) 16 on 31/12/2005.
The hypothesis represented by (9) has the following interpretation within the context
of this article: the ability to become visible to program inspectors does not differ be-
tween households where the youngest child was about to turn 16 on 31/12/2005 and
households where the youngest child has recently turned 16 on that same date. The hy-
pothesis represented by (10) requires that these same two groups of households differ
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the group where the youngest child had not turned 16 would have a higher probabil-
ity of selection.
We have postponed a more detailed discussion on the validity of these hypotheses to
the next section. For now, we assume that both are valid and proceed with the presen-
tation of our identification strategy. From equation (7), it is easy to see that identifica-
tion comes from the following ratio:
λ1 ¼ E Y i c− − E Y i cþg= E Ti c− − E Ti cþgj½j½fj½j½f ð11Þ
This strategy is equivalent to the use of an instrumental variable. In this case, the eli-gibility works as an instrument for participation. In intuitive terms, it explores the con-
trast between individuals with ages that are very close to the eligibility threshold. The
variation in eligibility for these individuals induces an exogenous variation in BFP par-
ticipation which, in turn, induces a causal effect on the probability of being employed
in the formal sector.
For operational purposes, we will use a sample restricted to households with a youn-
gest child aged around “c”, given the unique role of these households in the identifica-
tion of the parameter of interest. In this sample, we apply the instrumental variable
estimator, where the first stage may be represented by the following equation:
Ti ¼ α2 þ β2 Ii– cð Þ þ λ2Di þ γ2Di Ii – cð Þ þ δ2Xi þ ζ i ð12Þ
where Di indicates whether the household is eligible through the age criterion, i.e.:
Di ¼ 1: Ii < cð Þ ð13Þ
To put it in another way, in our strategy, Di serves as an instrument for Ti. Anotherimportant issue from the operational perspective is what should be considered “near
the age limit for eligibility”. For this definition, we follow the procedure suggested by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), noting that such a procedure is proposed for the
case of sharp discontinuity. In the case of fuzzy discontinuity, as in our estimation,
there is a procedure designed to identify the optimal size of the window, but it is
known that this size must be a little larger than that indicated for the sharp case.
3.2.1 Heterogeneous effects and interpretation of the identified parameter
In the literature on impact assessment, it is common to relax the hypothesis of homo-
geneous effect, allowing the benefits of the programme in question to vary between in-
dividuals. Thus, equation (7) shall present λ1i as opposed to λ1. Nothing changes for
the matter of identification and estimation procedures described previously.
However, there is a significant change in the interpretation of the parameter identi-
fied by the right-hand side of the equation (11) and estimated by instrumental variables.
The identified parameter, denoted by LATE, becomes the expected value of the effect
of the programme for a subgroup of the population known as “compliers”. This sub-
group consists of households whose participation is defined by eligibility. In other
words, they participate when they are eligible and do not participate when they are not.
In our article, this translates into households participating in 2005 with children who
are 16 years old in December and who do not participate in 2006, when they become
ineligible16.
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also requires two additional identification hypotheses17. The first, known as “mono-
tonicity”, requires that there be no household that decides to participate in the pro-
gram when it is not eligible and decides not to participate when it is eligible (what
literature calls “defier” behaviour). That is, besides the compliers, we admit the ex-
istence of only two other types of households for whom participation is not guided
by eligibility: the one that always participate regardless of being eligible or not
(“always taker”) and the one that never participate regardless of being eligible or
not (“never taker”).
The second additional hypothesis is more abstract and it is known as independ-
ence. In our context, this hypothesis states that the potential outcomes of participa-
tion and occupational choice conditioned to each of the possible eligibility statuses
(eligible or not) is independent of the eligibility status actually observed for the
household. For example, an eligible household which actually participates in the
programme would have an unobserved participation result if it were not eligible. The
hypothesis in question requires that these two potential outcomes of participation,
when it is eligible and when it is not, be independent of whether the household is eli-
gible or not. The same goes for potential occupational choices associated to the con-
dition of being eligible or not.
It is important to note that these two additional hypotheses are not testable, unlike
the first two cases described in section 3.2, which will be considered again in the next
section.4 Preliminary empirical information
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
As seen in the previous section, the implementation of our identification strategy re-
quires the availability of household-level information about the children’s dates of birth,
supply of labour to informal sector and about receiving the BFP benefit. The National
Household Sample Survey (PNAD) 2006, conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geog-
raphy and Statistics (IBGE) and used in this study, contains this information.
PNAD is an annual household survey that covers the entire country and collects in-
formation on the features of the homes and their residents. In particular, the informa-
tion on the date of birth and job (in)formality were always present in the survey’s
traditional module. In the 2006 PNAD, there is an additional module on the character-
istics of the access to some income transfers from social programmes at the house-
holds. In this additional module, there is a question specifically about Bolsa Família18.
The 2006 PNAD surveyed 410,241 people, in 145,547 households nationwide.
Regarding the definition of informality, we work with the one used in most studies
on informality with Brazilian data, which distinguishes employees by having an employ-
ment registration signed by the employer (carteira assinada) and allocates all em-
ployers to the formal sector and the self-employed to the informal.
At this point of the analysis, the definition of our sample is subject to two constraints.
The first restriction was imposed by our methodology, which makes exclusive use of
observations around the threshold that defines eligibility. In our context, this means
restricting the sample to households with the youngest child at around 16 years of age.
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on we will comment on additional restrictions.
Figure 2a and b show two different measures of labour input devoted to the informal
sector, as a function of the gap in months (measured on 31/12/2005) that separates the
age of the youngest child from his/her 16th birthday. The measures are share of house-
hold working hours in the informal sector (graph 2a) and share of household where the
main job of the head is an informal one. These figures are constructed analogously to
Figure 1. Thus, positive (negative) values on the horizontal axis represent households
(in)eligible for the programme throughout 2006 by the criterion of the age of the youn-
gest child. And, as in Figure 1, the points on the graphs represent average values of
household groups that were grouped together according to the age of the youngest
child, in two-month periods (see Figure 3).
It is noted that either measure of employment in the informal sector is quite similar
among the two groups being compared. That is, labour input devoted to the informal
sector does not seem to vary with the household’s eligibility to BFP. It is worth notingFigure 2 a) Share of Household Working Hours in the Informal Sector. b) Share of Informality among





























































































Figure 3 Estimate of the density function of the gap in months between the age of the youngest
child on 31/12/2005 and exactly 16 years of age. Source: 2006 PNAD.
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gible group. Therefore, it is noted that eligibility influences participation which, in turn,
does not seem to influence informality. This result will be confirmed in our estimates
with the instrumental variable method, adapted to the context of fuzzy regression dis-
continuity. Before going to the results, however, we shall report some evidence that
shows that the method is, indeed, adequate for our purposes.
4.2 Testing identification hypotheses
In summary, the identification of our parameter of interest relies on four hypotheses: i)
condition of local exclusion (around c), represented by (9); ii) validity of the instrument
(also around c), represented by (10); iii) monotonicity; and iv) independence. Ideally,
we would like to be able to test the validity of all of them. However, the last two are
not testable hypotheses. Therefore, the provision of evidence about the validity relies
on the first two.
4.2.1 Validity of the Instrument
The hypothesis of the validity of the instrument is easily tested, since it consists in
comparing the conditional means of observed variables, as expressed in equation (10).
The coefficient λ2 in the equation (12) captures exactly the difference between the two
sides of equation (10). Therefore, testing the significance of this coefficient is one way
of testing the hypothesis of the instrument’s validity.
Note that we are including in this sample a group with a high probability of behaving
like an “always taker”, composed of households with PCHIs less than or equal to R$ 50.00.
As stated earlier, this group is eligible regardless of the household’s age composition. Thus,
the propensity to participate in the programme for this group of households may not vary
with the age of the youngest child.
On the other hand, households with high PCHIs tend to behave like “never takers”,
since the probability of being registered tends to be very low, regardless of the age of
the youngest child. In fact, the percentage of beneficiaries is 0.7 per cent when we ana-
lyse households with PCHIs over R$ 700.0020.
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source of identification in our empirical strategy is the group of “compliers”. Therefore,
the smaller the share of “compliers” or greater the participation of “always takers” and
“never-takers”, the lower the power of our identification strategy. In particular, a de-
crease in the share of “compliers” tends to invalidate our second identification hypoth-
esis, represented by (10).
As such, we tested this hypothesis with three different samples. In the first sample,
we did not add any restriction relative to what was mentioned in the previous section
(sample I). In the second sample, we excluded households with PCHIs over R$ 700.00
(sample II). In the third sample, we excluded households with PCHIs lower than R$
50.00 and over R$ 700.00 (sample III).
Table 1 above reports the estimates for λ2 in three pairs of columns corresponding to
the three samples. In each pair of columns we report the coefficients estimates and
their standard errors in the first column; the second statistic is in brackets below the
first one.
The results in Table 1 indicate that among the 12 specifications considered (4 win-
dows x 3 filters), only one coefficient is not significantly different from zero at the 95
per cent confidence level. In all other specifications, the estimates are positive and sig-
nificantly different from zero, a result which supports the hypothesis that the eligibility
criteria based on the age of the youngest child positively affects the propensity to par-
ticipate in the program, for households where the age of the youngest child was close
to 16 on 31/12/2005. In other words, we have evidence that the propensity to benefit
from BFP drops significantly when the household does not meet the eligibility criteria
for BFP’s variable benefit.
A more formal test of the strength of the instrument is provided by a F-statistics in
the first stage that compare OLS and IV models. We perform these tests for the regres-
sions using the optimal bandwidth (first line). The results confirm the power of our in-
strument for the sample with no further restrictions (first column). For the other
samples with additional restrictions (second and third column) one has to be moreTable 1 Instrument validity test (household head)




PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Households with PCHIs > R$
50.00 and PCHIs < $ 700.00
Coef. Optimal window Coef. Optimal window Coef. Optimal window
λ2 0.057 1.61 0.081 1.78 0.081 1.76
(standard error) (0.049) (0.030) (0.030)
λ2 (bandwidth = 110) 0.062 1.77 0,069 1.96 0.076 1.93
(standard error (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
λ2 (bandwidth = 125) 0.066 2.01 0.059 2.23 0.065 2.20
erro-padão) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
λ2 (bandwidth = 150) 0.089 2.41 0.062 2.67 0.066 2.64
(standard error) (0.042) (0.025) (0.026)
F-test1 67,781 5,009 7,781
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source: 2006 PNAD.
Note: F-statistics are related to regressions with results reported in the first line.
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instruments. Since these two samples were built to increase the power of the instru-
ment, and the opposite happened, we will have the unrestricted sample as our baseline.
In the second column of each pair of columns we report the window size used. As
mentioned earlier, there is no indicated procedure to determine the optimal size of the
window in the case of fuzzy discontinuity. Thus, we consider alternative sizes, given
that the optimal size for the window, in the case of fuzzy discontinuity, should be
slightly higher than that recommended in the case of acute discontinuity. The four dif-
ferent window sizes considered originate the four lines of results. In the first line we
consider the size recommended by the procedure for acute discontinuity. In the other
lines we consider larger windows: 10 per cent larger in the second line, 25 per cent lar-
ger in the third line and 50 per cent larger in the fourth line. The indicated window
sizes were around two months.
4.2.2 Condition of exclusion
The condition of exclusion around c is not so easy to test, since it involves the behav-
iour of a variable that has not been observed. This hypothesis requires the continuity of
the unobservable variable around c. There are two common procedures in the litera-
ture to provide indirect evidence about the validity of this hypothesis. In the first pro-
cedure, there is a search for evidence of continuity in the control variables (x). It is
expected that a sharp discontinuity in the observed variables may reflect discontinuities
in unobserved variables.
Table 2 presents a comparison of certain observable characteristics of the household
head and of the family as a whole, recorded in the 2006 PNAD among households
where the age of the youngest child is slightly less and slightly more than 16 on 31/12/
2005. To define the groups marked as eligible and ineligible, we used a radius of two
months, as in the previous item. We also followed the tables in the previous section re-
garding the delineation of three distinct samples, according to the use of per capita
household income for this purpose.Table 2 Balancing—characteristics of the eligible and the non-eligible





PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Households with
PCHIs > R$ 50.00
and PCHIs < $ 700.00
Eligible Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible Eligible Non-eligible
Individual characteristics
Gender (% de men) 78.9 75.5 78.2 77.6 78.5 77.1
Years of schooling 6.9 7.2 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1
Age 45.3 44.4 44.8 43.7 44.8 43.6
Household characteristics
No. of people in the family 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.5
Resident in the NO/NE regions 38.7 40.6 39.9 42.4 38.4 42.0
Total per capita income 508.1 544.1 306.3 304.4 313.3 310.1
Number of observations 284 310 238 250 232 245
Source: 2006 PNAD.
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spective comparison group. For some variables such as age of the head of household
and the number of people in the household, the proximity between groups is striking
in any of the three samples considered. Even in the case of other variables, the values
tend not to differ significantly between the eligible and ineligible groups. The biggest
changes are recorded for variable geographical location and household income. Even
the difference in this last variable is limited to the first sample only.
In the second procedure, to provide evidence regarding the validity of the condition
of exclusion, the evidence is derived from the expected consequences on the behaviour
of variables observed in a scenario where this assumption is no longer valid.
In our context, we can think of two types of scenarios where the condition of exclu-
sion ceases to be valid: i) if the household manipulates information about the age of the
youngest child, and ii) if the household conceives another child when the age of the
youngest child is approaching 16.
If the first scenario is correct, one would expect a discontinuity in the distribution of
households according to the age of the youngest child, with a pronounced concentra-
tion of households with the age of the youngest child at slightly less than 16. Graph 3
shows a nonparametric estimation of the density function of the variable ‘gap’ restricted
to the domain of −30 months to +30 months21. The hypothesis of manipulation would
gain force if there is an increase in the mass of the distribution immediately to the right
of zero. The results do not seem to indicate that there is a relatively higher discontinu-
ity around the age defined as the program eligibility threshold22. If there is some vari-
ation around zero, it goes in the opposite direction, that is, a mass increase to the left
of zero. We applied the test of manipulation proposed by McCrary (2008) as a robust-
ness check for potential non-random sorting about the age of the youngest child. Our
results indicate no statistical evidence of a discontinuity in the density function of the
households according to the age of the youngest child at the cutoff.
That means that the evidence above does not corroborate the hypothesis of manipula-
tion of the information about the age of the youngest child. Added to this evidence is the
fact that the programme agent asks for the birth certificates of beneficiary residents.
In the second scenario considered above, we observed that only 0.09 per cent of
households with children aged between 15 and 16 years have other children aged be-
tween 0 to 1 year23.
As such, the discontinuity in the definition of eligibility based on the age of the youn-
gest child will be explored in this article as being exogenous.5 Main results
In this section we present three sets of results for the effect of BFP on labour input al-
located to informality, shown in equation (7) by coefficient λ1. The difference among
these three sets relates to the different dimensions of informality we consider.
Table 3 shows the main results of this work. These are the estimated values referring to
effect of Bolsa Família on the proportion of working hours of the household dedicated to
informal activities. The tables follow the same pattern as the previous one, with sample re-
strictions related to household income varying across the columns and restrictions related
to bandwidth size for the age of the youngest child varying across the rows.
Table 3 Impact of BFP on the hours worked in the informal sector





PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Households with
PCHIs > R$ 50.00
and PCHIs < $ 700.00
Coef. Optimal Window Coef. Optimal Window Coef. Optimal Window
Bolsa-Família −2.006 1.67 −1.778 2.08 −2.152 2.00




−2.391 1.84 −1.866 2.29 −2.463 2.20
(standard error) (1.497) (1.78) (1.525)
Bolsa-Família
(bandwidth - 125)
−1.965 2.09 −2.633 2.60 −2.072 2.50
(standard error) (1.134) (1.568) (1.327)
Bolsa-Família
(bandwidth - 150)
−1.431 2.50 −1.752 3.12 −1.638 3.00
(standard error) (0.974) (1.425) (1.313)
Source: 2006 PNAD.
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reported in the table (3 samples × 4 window sizes). That is, if anything Bolsa-Familia
shifts the supply of working hours to the formal sector. However, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that all estimates may be zero at the 95 per cent confidence level (Table 3).
That is, we were unable to identify any effect of Bolsa Família in the proportion of
working hours of the household dedicated to informal activities25.
One should note that magnitudes of point estimations are not small, however stand-
ard errors are also large. So it may be the case that BFP induces formal attachment to
labour market but we just could not estimate it precisely. Assuming that this is the case
one possible reasoning for the counter intuitive impact of BFP is that poor households
may live far from formal job opportunities, and hence the money from BFP may be
used to finance transportation cost required in applications for formal jobs.
We repeated the same exercise to estimate the effect of BFP on the probability of the
main occupation held by the head of the household being informal24. In this case, we
aim to identify some adjustment in the extensive margin of labor input as our previous
results indicate no impact in the intensive margin. The results reported in Table 4 go
in the same direction as those estimated for the household hours in Table 3. That is, al-
though the point estimate is negative, the program has no impact on the propensity of
household heads occupying informal jobs.
Note that the results for the extensive margin reported in Table 4 demand some extra
caution in their interpretation. The sample in this case is restricted to occupied house-
hold heads, which means a selective group. Even though, we see as informative the ro-
bustness of the results shown in Table 3 for another exercise where both the measure
of informality and the sample are different from the previous one.
Finally, as the last set of results we report in Table 5 the estimated values for the BFP
effect on the probability of the secondary occupation of the household (which can be
the secondary occupation of the household head or the main occupation of another
household member) being informal. Once more, at the 95 per cent confidence level, we
Table 4 Impact of BFP on the occupational choice of the household head




PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Households with PCHIs > R$
50.00 and PCHIs < $ 700.00
Coef. Optimal Window Coef. Optimal Window Coef. Optimal Window
Bolsa-Família −3.237 1.61 −2.417 1.78 −2.429 1.76




−2.339 1.77 −2.846 1.96 −2.629 1.94
(standard error) (1.612) (1.797) (1.580)
Bolsa-Família
(bandwidth - 125)
−1.996 2.01 −2.607 2.23 −2.697 2.20
(standard error) (1.387) (1.875) (1.747)
Bolsa-Família
(bandwidth - 150)
−1.122 2.41 −2.539 2.67 −2.648 2.64
(standard error) (0.973) (1.614) (1.563)
Source: 2006 PNAD.
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the point estimate is negative, the program has no impact on secondary occupational
choice of the household, between formal and informal jobs.6 Conclusions
In this study, we sought to identify the extent to which Bolsa Família Program has chan-
ged either hours of work or occupational choices towards informal jobs. Unlike what was
found in the existing empirical literature, our results suggest that the programme has no
impact neither in the allocation of hours nor on the occupational choice of beneficiaries
between formal and informal jobs.Table 5 Impact of BFP on the secondary occupational choice




PCHIs < R$ 700.00
Households with PCHIs > R$
50.00 and PCHIs < $ 700.00
Coef. Optimal window Coef. Optimal window Coef. Optimal window
Bolsa-Família −1.196 1.74 −1.997 1.81 −1.904 1.91




−1.614 1.92 −1970 1.99 −1.626 2.10
(standard error) (1.563) (1.366) (0.983)
Bolsa-Família
(bandwidth - 125)
−1.304 2.18 −1.347 2.27 −1.301 2.38
(standard error) (1.627) (1.236) (1.208)
Bolsa-Família
(bandwidth - 150)
−1.107 2.62 2.72 −0.854 2.86
(standard error) (1.023) (1.235) (0.956)
Source: 2006 PNAD.
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have considered. Twelve separate household samples were used to estimate our param-
eter of interest. In addition, for each sample we estimate the effect of the programme
both in the allocation of working hours and occupational choice, regarding both the
main occupation of the household head and in the secondary occupation in the house-
hold. In all these situations, the estimate was statistically nil.
One of the major contributions of our article is the application of a method that al-
lows us to deal with the problem of self-selection based on unobservable characteris-
tics. We exploited a discontinuity present in the eligibility criteria of the programme,
about the age of the youngest child. We assumed that the discontinuity around a crit-
ical age value (16 years old) represents an exogenous variation in eligibility that could
be accompanied by a variation in programme participation also around this critical
value. This last variation would, in turn, identify the desired effect on the occupational
choice of the household heads.
Finally, it is worth mentioning two additional observations. On the one hand, two
of the four hypotheses behind our method are testable. We presented evidence in
favour of both testable hypotheses, which puts us in a relatively comfortable position
about the suitability of the method to our context. On the other hand, the method re-
stricts the identification of Bolsa Família’s effect on the group of households with at
least one child and whose youngest (or only) child is around 16 on 31/12/2005. Noth-
ing prevents the effect from being different from what we reported for families with
younger children.Endnotes
1In this regard, see Chapter 4 of Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a review of the effects
of CCT programs on the labour supply.
2In principle the result on wages could be driven by selection of lower ability workers
in this sector. However studies using longitudinal data and (individuals) fixed effect es-
timators confirm lower wages to informal jobs.
3See Imbens and Lemieux 2008.
4While the first study analyses Progresa, in Mexico, others analyse BFP.
5Teixeira (2010) as well as Marino and Mendes (2013) also conduct this type of ana-
lysis. However, they rule out, by assumption, the influence of unobservable factors in
the selection of BFP beneficiaries.
6For instance, threshold values for earnings may vary in real terms if they are fixed in
nominal terms.
7In the case of child health, prenatal testing for pregnant women and medical care
for nursing mothers between 14 and 44 years are required, in addition to paediatric
monitoring of the growth and development of children aged up to six years. In the
case of education, the conditionalities are associated with the access to - and mainten-
ance of - children and youth in school.
8Two other benefits were incorporated into BFP after 2006: the Youth Variable Bene-
fit and the Benefit to Overcome Extreme Poverty (BSP).
9In practice, the municipal agents identify potential beneficiaries and can track the
status of BFP beneficiary households in databases containing formal income sources,
Barbosa and Corseuil IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2014) 3:37 Page 17 of 18such as the Continuous Cash Benefit (BPC) and Annual Report of Social Information
(RAIS) databases.
10All the information regarding the management of BFP are from Soares and Sátyro
(2009).
11MDS is the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger. It
was created in 2004 with the goal of promoting the social inclusion, food and nutrition
security, full social assistance and a minimum citizen income to the families living in
the poverty (http:///www.mds.gov.br). CEF is the Federal Savings and Loans Bank.
12We used the age on 31/12/2005 because on this date we are able to identify house-
holds whose youngest child’s age has recently crossed the border of eligibility (c), mak-
ing those households ineligible in 2006, as well as households that remained eligible in
2006 because the age of the youngest child only crosses the border immediately after
the turn of the year. These households will be crucial in our identification strategy, as
will be detailed later.
13Therefore, we can identify a causal relationship according to the definition usually
applied by economists, in which the causality between variables X and Y can be identi-
fied if we observe the response of Y to a change in X, keeping everything else constant.
14The term “fuzzy” refers to the relationship between participation and eligibility,
which is not deterministic in the case of acute regression discontinuity.
15For the sake of simplifying notation we suppress X from the conditioning part of
the expectation operators from now on.
16There is a discussion in the literature about how interesting is the identification of
a valid parameter for such a restricted group (see Heckman [1997]). However, in our
case, it can be argued that it is of interest to identify this group in view of the change
in the eligibility criteria that occurred in July 2008, which now considers eligible house-
holds with young children up to 17 years.
17The work of Imbens and Angrist (1994), which coined the term LATE, presents a
more technical discussion about the identification of this parameter. The book by
Angrist and Pischke (2009) provides a more intuitive approach to the same topic.
18The question is: “In September 2006, did a resident of this household receive money
from the social program Bolsa Familia?” Followed these possible answers: 1) Yes; 2) No.
19We classified as employed during the reference week individuals who executed any
paid work during it, or the ones who executed an unpaid work in that week for at least
fifteen hours, or who have paid jobs of which they are temporarily away. It is not con-
sidered here as occupied individuals who executed any work for their own consump-
tion or construction during the reference week.
20Usually, the “always taker” and “never taker” groups are not easily identifiable and,
therefore, this procedure of restricting the sample is unusual. Note that we are taking
advantage of the two-dimensional nature of BFP’s eligibility rule (age composition and
PCHI) to identify the “never-takers”.
21The estimate was achieved through the Kernel method with Epanechnikov weighting.
22It can be argued that there is more interest, on the part of the households, to manipu-
late such information in front of a programme agent than in front of an IBGE interviewer.
However, since the 2006 PNAD collected information on BFP and IBGE is a government
agency, it is possible that a household prone to manipulating information in front of
programme agents showed the same likelihood to do so in front of an IBGE interviewer.
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the exogenous character that we attribute to the criterion based on the age of the youn-
gest child, which is changing the age at which children leave home. In particular, it
would be a problem for our analysis if the children left home below the age limit for
eligibility in an environment without Bolsa Familia and had postponed this move as
BFP beneficiary to maximize the period during which they receive the benefit. There is
no information available to check this hypothesis.
24This was estimated as a linear probability model even with a binary dependent vari-
able. The parameter identification and interpretation would complicate considerably
for a limited dependent model.
25Results are obtained from local linear regressions. We include higher order polyno-
mials for robustness checks and it does not substantially affect our results.
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